The Uneven Legal Push for Europe:Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe by Wind, Marlene et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
The Uneven Legal Push for Europe
Wind, Marlene; Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Rotger, Gabriel Pons
Published in:
European Union Politics
DOI:
10.1177/1465116508099761
Publication date:
2009
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Wind, M., Martinsen, D. S., & Rotger, G. P. (2009). The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation
when National Courts go to Europe. European Union Politics, 10(1), 63-88.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116508099761
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
http://eup.sagepub.com
European Union Politics 
DOI: 10.1177/1465116508099761 
 2009; 10; 63 European Union Politics
Marlene Wind, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Gabriel Pons Rotger 
 Courts go to Europe
The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation when National
http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/1/63
 The online version of this article can be found at:
 Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
 can be found at:European Union Politics Additional services and information for 
 http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts:
 http://eup.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions:
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/10/1/63 Citations
 at Copenhagen University Library on February 26, 2009 http://eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The Uneven Legal Push for
Europe
Questioning Variation when National
Courts go to Europe
Marlene Wind
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Gabriel Pons Rotger
Danish Institute of Governmental Research (AKF), Denmark
A B S T R A C T
National courts have been key players in the legal push for
Europe, though notably to varying degrees. This paper exam-
ines the persisting variations in the referral rates of national
courts and the underlying causal factors, aiming to better
understand why some member states’ courts have been
more reluctant to join in the legal push for Europe. By using
econometric methods, it challenges the modified neo-
functionalist argument that the extent of intra-EC trade
explains the referral practice of the individual member states.
Majoritarian democracy is hypothesized as a causal factor in
the low referral rates for some of the EU member states. Key
characteristics of majoritarian democracy versus consti-
tutional democracy are outlined and the former is further
detailed by means of two case studies: Denmark and the UK.
Finally, a panel data analysis is conducted and finds evidence
of a negative impact of majoritarian democracy on the
number of referrals. The paper concludes that, owing to the
uneven legal push for Europe, some member states and their
citizens remain at arms’ length from the legal integration
process – and, in consequence, from the full impact of
European integration.
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Introduction
Judicial activity in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) continues to increase.
Through the preliminary referral procedure and the willingness of national
courts to bring cases to the ECJ, the legal and political content of the European
Community has gradually, but fundamentally, been transformed. For quite
some time already, the European integration process has been about much
more than merely liberalizing trade and integrating markets. Sensitive
national issues, including social and health policy, monetary policy and free
movement rights for employed as well as unemployed persons, have become
‘Europeanized’ over the years (Martinsen, 2005; Martinsen and Vrangbæk,
2008; Wind, 2009 forthcoming). The ECJ has been one of the main engines
driving this process.
Considered alone, however, the European Court is a rather weak insti-
tution. In order to influence the direction of the EU, the Court fundamentally
depends on national courts and their willingness to bring cases forward.
National courts thus constitute the crucial link between litigants and the ECJ,
conditioning which questions will be brought to the ECJ and the specific
content of such questions. As demonstrated below, however, the referral rates
of national courts continue to vary considerably. Courts in some member
states are much more reluctant to participate in the legal push for further inte-
gration. Such variation has more general implications because it suggests that,
in some member states, individual citizens are confronted with greater thresh-
olds that have to be overcome when approaching the European Union than
occurs in other member states. The puzzle of this paper is why national courts
in some member states have been more reluctant to bring cases to the ECJ
and have therefore not joined the legal push for Europe.
The existing literature generally tends to focus on the aggregate picture:
the dramatic and continuing increase in preliminary referrals to the ECJ,
which helped build the European polity we know today. One such string of
arguments applies econometric analysis and has launched an ambitious
theory of national judicial behaviour (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998, 2004).
In short, by using econometric tools and aggregated data, Stone Sweet and
Brunell claim that the rise in preliminary referrals can be predicted by a rise
in transnational activity, and that transnational activity is simultaneously
fuelled by the consolidation of legislation. In order to research our puzzle, we
test this feedback causality in our paper.
The aim of this paper is threefold: first, to descriptively clarify patterns of
variation in the preliminary referral practice in the national courts to the ECJ
on the basis of our updated data set;1 second, to test the modified neo-
functionalist argument that the level of intra-EC trade causes the number of
preliminary referrals on the basis of econometric analysis; and, third, to discuss
European Union Politics 10(1)6 4
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alternative determinants that are possibly significant to the referral patterns of
national courts. The impact of majoritarian democracy is hypothesized as a
causal factor in the hesitation of some member states to participate in the legal
push for Europe. The typology of majoritarian democracy includes the Nordic
member states as well as the United Kingdom. The impact of majoritarian
democracy is assessed by means of panel data analysis.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly describe the histori-
cal and contemporary data on the varying referral patterns of national courts.
We then present the modified neo-functionalist argument concerning the
dynamics behind legal integration. The fourth section tests for the presence
and nature of Granger causality between intra-EC trade and the number of
preliminary referrals. The following three sections deal with the third aim of
this paper, contrasting majoritarian democracy with constitutional democ-
racy, detailing majoritarian democracy by means of case studies focusing on
Denmark and the UK, and providing evidence of different sources of referral
heterogeneity by means of panel data analysis. The final section provides
some concluding remarks.
On variation – the referral patterns of national courts
The uniformity and expansion of Community law largely depends on the
legal push for integration that national courts bring to the ECJ through pre-
liminary referrals, based on Article 234 of the Treaty. Historical and recent
data tell us that the national courts have continuously fed the system (Alter,
2000, 2001). As Figure 1 demonstrates, Article 234 referrals continued to
increase significantly throughout the examined period from 1961 to 2004.
Very recent figures confirm this historical trend. By the end of 2004, 5292
preliminary referrals had been made to the European Court. From 1993
onwards, more than 200 referrals were made annually, with a maximum of
264 referrals in 1998.
However, one of the most pronounced characteristics behind the
aggregated trend illustrated in Figure 1 is the important heterogeneity of
preliminary referral-generation across member states (see Figures 2 and 3).2
In Figure 3, the number of referrals has been weighted by population size by
dividing a country’s total number of referrals in the period by its average
population size in the period. The population size figures were offset by two
years in order to account for delayed effects. The value for Austria in 2002 is
provisional. The value for the UK in 2001 is an estimate. For the UK in 2002,
the data were missing and the preceding year was used instead. For Germany,
the data on the Federal Republic of Germany are used until 1990 and from
1991 the data include the former GDR.
Wind et al. The Uneven Legal Push for Europe 6 5
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Modified neo-functionalism
Many observers have been fascinated by the manner in which the national
courts and judges who were raised in a very national legal tradition ended
European Union Politics 10(1)6 6
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Figure 1 Trend in total number of references.
Source: European Court Reports; own database. 
Figure 2 Preliminary references 1961–2004 made by individual member states.
Figure 3 Preliminary references per million inhabitants 1961–2004.
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up indulging in the process of European legal integration (Wind, 2001). As
we have seen from examining the entire life-span data of the European
Community, the national courts have continued to participate actively in the
constitutionalization of Europe. Thus, it is hardly surprising that recent
scholarship has been more concerned with detecting general trends and
proposing sweeping ‘grand theories’ regarding the dynamics of European
integration than with detecting and explaining why some member state
courts have made significantly fewer referrals than others.
One very important theory concerning the dynamics of legal and politi-
cal integration has been initiated by Stone Sweet and co-authors and labelled
‘modified neo-functionalism’ (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998, 2004; Stone
Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998; Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002). Although the
theory has by no means escaped criticism from various angles (Alter, 2000,
2001; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001), it has established itself firmly in explaining
the processes and causes of European integration. The theory consists of both
theoretical abstractions on dynamic institutional integration as well as empiri-
cal, econometric testing of the theoretical assertions. The authors thus present
a macro theory (Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002: 1209), grounded in various
sets of data analysis and systematic empirical testing.
One of the important components of the theory is its explicit assumption
regarding the causalities of European integration. According to the theory,
European integration is driven by a self-reinforcing causal system involving
trading, litigation, legislation and lobbying (Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002).
The integration process is essentially constituted by three causal factors: trans-
national exchange, dispute resolution and legislation (Stone Sweet and Brunell,
1998). The process is initiated by transnational exchange, which constitutes ‘a
critical catalyst’ for the further steps of integration (Stone Sweet and Brunell,
1998: 65). Among other features, the theory implies the existence of a virtuous
circle or feedback system between the three causal factors. The integrative
dynamics of this virtuous circle are strengthened by the constitutionalization
of the Treaty system, in which the consolidation of the constitutional principles
of direct effect and supremacy plays a major role. The theory ‘suggests that
once the causal connections among exchange, triadic dispute resolutions, and
rules are forged, the legal system will operate according to a self-sustaining
and expansionary dynamic’ (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998: 65).
Without doubt, the theory has become a main contribution in addressing
the puzzle of this paper: what accounts for the differences between member
states in the referral of preliminary questions to the ECJ? As an alternative to
existing explanations, Stone Sweet and Brunell argue that variance in cross-
national activity creates variance in the production of preliminary referrals
(Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998: 67).
Wind et al. The Uneven Legal Push for Europe 6 7
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To test this hypothesis, Stone Sweet and Brunell use the variable trans-
national activity and apply cointegration analysis. Transnational activity is
measured on the basis of intra-EC trade. Stone Sweet and Brunell clarify that
they use intra-EC trade as the indicator of transnational activity/transnational
exchange, since they find that intra-EC trade is the only reasonable indicator
of transnational exchange for which reliable information has been reported
annually since the foundation of the European Community (Stone Sweet and
Brunell, 1998).
Of the four propositions they test in their analysis, two specifically
concern the relationship between transnational activity and preliminary
referrals, and thus national courts. The two testable propositions are (Stone
Sweet and Brunell, 1998: 66–7):
1. transnational exchange generates social demand for judicial activity, and
2. higher levels of transnational activity will push for an ever-increasing
number of supranational judicial or legislative rules.
The authors argue that their econometric analysis supports the view that
transnational exchange has been a crucial driving factor behind the construc-
tion of the EC legal system, since they find a cointegration relationship
between intra-EC trade and Article 177 referrals (Stone Sweet and Brunell,
1998: 69).
On the basis of our constructed database, we test the theoretical argument
that a driving dynamic behind national court referrals to the ECJ is the
member state’s level of intra-EC trade by means of a causality test between
intra-EC trade and preliminary referrals by national courts.
Testing causality
Stone Sweet and Brunell have put forward a causal explanation for the general
behaviour of the national courts. They found cointegration, i.e. a long-term
relationship, between intra-EC trade and the number of Article 234 (177)
referrals for the period 1961–92 and interpret this as evidence supporting their
modified neo-functionalist theory (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998). They later
repeated the analysis for a longer sample, 1961–98, and restated their
conclusions (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2004). As is well known in time series
analysis, however, the presence of cointegration implies the presence of
Granger causality, but it is silent about the direction of causality; for example,
under cointegration, causality might go exclusively from legal to economic
integration.
European Union Politics 10(1)6 8
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As pointed out by Granger himself (1969), cointegration is not a 
necessary condition for Granger causality. Thus, in order to confirm the 
neo-functionalist prediction, it is not necessary to analyse the presence of co-
integration. Pitarakis and Tridimas (2003) explore the direction of causality
between the two variables with a test robust to cointegration properties 
(see Dolado and Lütkepohl, 1996). They find causality from the number of
referrals to intra-EC trade but reject the presence of causality from intra-EC
trade to the number of referrals, which is contrary to the existence of the
virtuous circle predicted by Stone Sweet and Brunell’s neo-functionalist
arguments. However, Stone Sweet and Brunell do not regard this as compro-
mising their theoretical assumptions when they later refer to the work of
Pitarakis and Tridimas (see Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2004).
An important drawback of Pitarakis and Tridimas’s approach is the lack
of consideration of enlargement effects. The successive enlargements of the
European Community automatically increase together with the level of EC
trade for each country and the number of referrals, a feature possibly inducing
the causality test used by Pitarakis and Tridimas to find causality erroneously
(see Ng and Vogelsang, 2002). In order to assess the validity of Pitarakis and
Tridimas’s results, we use two causality tests, the one applied by Pitarakis
and Tridimas and a causality test robust to enlargement effects (see the
Appendix for details). We also conduct our analysis with a longer sample
(1961–2004).
When using the Pitarakis and Tridimas approach, we arrive at the same
conclusions as the authors; i.e. we do not reject the absence of causality from
intra-EC trade to the number of preliminary referrals but reject the absence
of causality from the number of referrals to intra-EC trade (see the p-values
at the bottom of columns 2 and 3 in Table 1).
The detected causal relationship appears rather dubious, however, given
that not even a substantial set of preliminary referrals should be able to cause
a significant unidirectional increase in intra-EC trade. The validity of the
results obtained with the help of the Pitarakis and Tridimas approach is
challenged by using a level shifts robust causality test (see Ng and Vogelsang,
2002). This test first filters the variables for relevant mean shifts and other
deterministic terms and then checks causality in relation to the cleaned
variables. Two level shifts at 1973 and 1995 are detected with intra-EC trade,
and a level shift at 1986 is detected with the number of referrals (see the
Appendix for details).
We find no evidence of causality in any direction with the Ng and
Vogelsang test (see the p-values at the bottom of columns 4 and 5 in Table 1).
As shown in Table 1, the coefficients associated with the first three lags in the
referrals variable in the trade equation are all insignificant, in contrast to the
Wind et al. The Uneven Legal Push for Europe 6 9
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results obtained with the previous analysis, which does not correct for level
shifts, in which the first lag in the number of referrals is significant. Our results
suggest that the causality relationship from legal integration to economic inte-
gration found in Pitarakis and Tridimas is the artefact of enlargement effects.
In sum, our causality analysis, which takes into account enlargement
effects, rejects the presence of any type of causality between intra-EC trade
and preliminary referrals. It is important to emphasize that Granger causality
is a dynamic concept requiring one variable to help predict another. The
absence of Granger causality therefore does not prevent the possible presence
of contemporaneous determinants of the number of referrals. In the next three
sections, we discuss the role of potential determinants of contemporaneous
variation in the number of referrals and analyse their empirical relevance by
means of panel data analysis.
European Union Politics 10(1)7 0
Table 1 Level shift robust Granger causality test
No demeaned variables Demeaned variables
—————————————— ———————————————
REFt TRADEt REFt TRADEt
Regressors Equation Equation Equation Equation
REFt –1 0.0673 0.0644 0.0746 –0.0133
(0.1818) (0.0278) (0.1933) (0.0519)
REFt –2 0.4212 0.0392 –0.2395 –0.0170
(0.1915) (0.0293) (0.1810) (0.0486)
REFt –3 0.2909 0.0187 0.1991 0.0117
(0.2000) (0.0306) (0.1740) (0.0467)
REFt –4 0.0326 0.0042 –0.1304 0.0137
(0.1809) (0.0277) (0.1719) (0.0461)
TRADEt –1 0.0205 0.8587 0.2581 0.5129
(1.189) (0.1822) (0.7369) (0.1977)
TRADEt –2 –0.1310 –0.3706 –1.0344 0.1008
(1.477) (0.2262) (0.8437) (0.2263)
TRADEt –3 0.0941 0.4174 0.0772 –0.1513
(1.479) (0.2264) (0.8453) (0.2268)
TRADEt –4 0.0491 –0.0485 –1.150 0.1226
(1.069) (0.1637) (0.7723) (0.2072)
Constant 0.9400 0.0678 0.0042 (0.0037)
(0.4559) (0.0698) (0.0354) (0.0095)
Trend 0.5028 0.0559
(0.1869) (0.0280)
Trend2 –0.0056 –0.0004
(0.0020) (0.0003)
Causality Test 0.9997 0.0250 0.5274 0.9659
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Alternative determinants of variation
Having rejected causality between intra-EC trade and preliminary referrals
in any direction, we will now discuss a number of alternative potential
determinants of the persisting variation in referral rates. We then use panel
data analysis to test for the effects on the number of preliminary referrals of
a set of independent variables: population size, years of EC membership as
an indicator of learning, intra-EC trade, enlargements introducing level shifts,
and the potential effect of the form of democracy. Whereas the likely impact
of the first set of independent variables has been discussed in the existing
literature, we focus on the last set as the main hypothesis of this paper. Our
hypothesis is that member states with the institutional legacy of majoritarian
democracy are more reluctant to participate in the construction and main-
tenance of the judicial constitutionalization of Europe. In this section, we will
present the key characteristics of majoritarian democracy versus consti-
tutional democracy that are argued to matter in the referral practice of EU
member states. We then further detail the characteristics of majoritarian
democracy by means of two case studies: Denmark and the UK. We will
examine some of the determining institutional features explaining why judges
who might gain from challenging the national legal hierarchy – from a narrow
point of view – tend not to do so.
Existing studies have provided very different explanations regarding the
degree to which individual member states have participated in the legal
constitutionalization of Europe. Among the explanatory factors pointed out
by existing studies are the extent to which a policy area is captured by interest
group politics (Alter, 2000; Alter and Vargas, 2000), the litigiousness of indi-
vidual societies (Alter, 2000; Conant, 2001), national legal education (Alter,
2000), judicial learning (Golub, 1996a), the calculative or strategic behaviour
of judges and inter-court competition (Golub, 1996b; Alter, 2001), and
domestic politics (Golub, 1996b).
These explanations are highly plausible for explaining the referral
practice of individual countries or within different sectors of politics. The
hypothesis of majoritarian democracy, however, focuses on a different set of
structuring institutions. The hypothesis holds that the institutional features
of law and politics and the traditional means of organizing their mutual
relationship might influence the willingness of national courts to refer matters
to the ECJ. The assumption is that countries with an institutional and demo-
cratic tradition of majoritarian democracy are more reluctant, perhaps even
sceptical, about referring preliminary questions to a supranational authority
than are countries that are rooted in some variant of constitutional democracy,
where the judicial review of legislation by courts is part of what defines good
Wind et al. The Uneven Legal Push for Europe 7 1
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‘democratic governance’ (Dworkin, 1996). Below, we draw out the main traits
characterizing majoritarian versus constitutional democracy. Since we are
specifically concerned in this paper with explaining why some member states
have made less use of the preliminary ruling procedure, we also present two
case studies from the majoritarian camp in order to provide more qualified
information about why national courts and judges may choose not to play
the game of engaging in supranational judicial review.
Majoritarian democracy is rooted in the notion of parliamentary supremacy
or sovereignty. The parliament (but not necessarily the government) is
perceived as a majoritarian institution forming the centre of government
(Dworkin, 1996; Ginsburg, 2003). The role of the courts is limited in majori-
tarian systems. For this reason, it has become commonplace to view consti-
tutional and majoritarian democracy as almost incommensurable: ‘The ideal
of limited government, or constitutionalism, is in conflict with the idea of
parliamentary sovereignty’ (Ginsburg, 2003: 2). Parliamentary governance
systems are founded upon the notion that parliamentary majorities represent
the ‘will of the people’ and that such majorities should not be subject to
judicial review (Dworkin, 1996: 19–20). Courts and judges are not account-
able to the people, and the right of the courts to strike down legislation other-
wise enjoying majority support places unacceptable limits on the popular will
and on democracy as such (Freeman, 1990: 332ff; Dworkin, 1996: 21ff). In this
reading, courts are regarded as a ‘counter-majoritarian’ force on the grounds
that they place the protection of rights and civil liberties by the courts above
‘the will of the people’.
It is important to emphasize that most majoritarian democracies have
constitutions that speak of the balance of power principle and even some kind
of court review. In actual practice, however, there has been little tradition in
these democracies of the courts challenging or actively reviewing legislation
in accordance with the constitution (Scheinin, 2001). Denmark, Sweden,
Finland and the UK all have roots in this tradition. The UK has no written
constitution, and the idea of parliamentary sovereignty has always been
extremely strong (Chalmers, 2001; Dworkin, 1996). Accordingly, the courts
have had almost no powers of legislative review and have generally regarded
themselves as ‘la bouche de la loi’; loyal primarily to the executive and the
democratically elected majority (Chalmers, 2001; Volcansek, 1992). In Finland,
the judicial review of legislation was directly forbidden up until a very recent
amendment to the constitution in 2000 (Nergelius, 2001: 85). In Sweden and
Denmark, the review of legislation is formally allowed but almost never
practised. The Danish courts have set aside legislation only once in the past
150 years (Nergelius, 2001). Moreover, the Nordic countries share a con-
ception of democracy in which the parliament is conceived as a superior
European Union Politics 10(1)7 2
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institution vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This perception of
democracy is echoed in the public debate, which ‘tend[ed] to conflate legit-
imacy and majoritarian parliamentarism’ (Føllesdal, 2002: 183). Moreover, the
majoritarian paradigm in the Nordic countries has cultivated ‘a corps of judges
who are unusually loyal to the legislator, never questioning his wisdom and
not perceiving its task as protecting the rights of the individual against the
state’ (Nergelius, 2001: 88).
Constitutional democracy is mainly an American invention, which only
gradually came to influence a number of European countries after World 
War II. Using Ronald Dworkin’s classical terminology (Dworkin, 1996: 15–26),
so-called ‘constitutional democracies’ generally embrace judicial review and
view it as a constitutive aspect of what it means to be a true democracy. Supra-
national judicial review at the European level is therefore perceived as a
natural extension of national practice; not as a threat. The theoretical as well
as the descriptive literature has recently drawn out some very general trends
characterizing constitutional democracies in Europe and elsewhere (Dworkin,
1996; Ginsburg, 2003; Kenny et al., 1999; Scheinin, 2001; Shapiro, 1999; Shapiro
and Stone, 1994; Sheive, 1995; Stone Sweet, 1999, 2002). These studies often
emphasize that judicial review became a reality in Europe after World War II
when the defeated powers, Germany and Italy, adopted the institution. Even
France had – by the Fifth Republic – introduced a form of constitutional
review through the Constitutional Council (Shapiro, 1999: 199; Sheive, 1995:
5–8; Stone Sweet, 1992, 1999).3 In reality, however, there has been great
variation in the manner in which judicial review was institutionalized in
different European countries (Kenny et al., 1999). Research suggests that
historical and institutional factors such as court structure, monism/dualism
and experience with dictatorship and/or communist rule influence the
emphasis countries place on judicial review and the need for limiting parlia-
mentary power (Magalhães, 1999; Sheive, 1995; see also Ginsburg, 2003; Stone
Sweet, 2002). For example, the Benelux countries have not practised judicial
review in a manner parallel to that of Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain. In
the Benelux countries, monism and the primacy of international law over
national law appear to carry much more explanatory power – including when
it comes to explaining the willingness of these countries to participate in the
dialogue with the ECJ. The Benelux countries all have rather strong monist
traditions, where ‘treaty law is a law of superior nature, stemming from
higher origins than domestic organs; consequently, international laws prevail
over national laws’, as the Luxembourg Cour supérieure de justice noted in
1954 (Bribosia, 1998: 35).4 In monist legal orders, it is the international ‘consti-
tution’ that places limitations on the national ruling majority (Mattli and
Slaughter, 1998: 275).
Wind et al. The Uneven Legal Push for Europe 7 3
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Despite these institutional and historical differences, the introduction of
the EU preliminary ruling system has had a strong impact on the ‘European
model’ of judicial review. In the European model of judicial review, the power
to try statutes is relegated to special constitutional courts, whereas in the US
model of judicial review all courts can try the constitutionality of any law
(Stone Sweet, 1999: 9). By shifting judicial review from the high courts to mid-
level and lower courts, Europe has increasingly come to resemble the USA in
the sense that all of the judicial bodies (in theory at least) are involved in
controlling the legislative output from the EU (Shapiro and Stone, 1994). We
will now briefly explore key institutional features of law and politics in two
of the member states belonging to the majoritarian democracy type. We argue
that these institutional factors structure Court behaviour and explain in part
why national courts within this type are more reluctant to refer questions to
the ECJ.
When courts don’t go to Europe: Denmark and the UK
Majoritarian democracies have an institutionalized reluctance about bringing
political decisions to the courts for clarification. This reluctance is likely to be
intensified when such clarification is externalized, taking place outside of the
national system. In the following, we first examine Denmark, where our quali-
tative data indicate that preliminary referrals have generally been avoided
through close cooperation between the national courts and the Danish exec-
utive. We then examine the UK case, in which the national courts have long
deliberately disregarded the possibility of externalizing legal clarification but
recently appear to have undergone a process of change in which preliminary
referrals occur more frequently. Even where ‘judicial learning’ appears to have
developed, however, it proceeds in a rather ‘sectorized’ manner, i.e. within
specific regulatory fields.
The Danish case
The Nordic countries all belong in the category of majoritarian democracies
and the category of ‘reluctant Europeans’, at least as regards making prelimi-
nary referrals. We are dealing with a group of countries regarding themselves
to be not only unique egalitarian welfare states but equally ‘highly hom-
ogenous, religiously, culturally and ethically’ (Føllesdal, 2002: 182). These
features have contributed to the development of a consensus culture in which
as many disputes as possible are solved outside the courtroom and where
‘going to court’ – perhaps in particular when it comes to being brought before
European Union Politics 10(1)7 4
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an international court – is avoided whenever possible (interview, Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2005 and survey).
As a European Community member since 1973, Denmark should be more
or less ‘socialized’ in relation to the European legal system; however, this
appears to be far from the case. A study conducted by Pagh (2004) of the
preliminary referral procedure in Denmark has pointed to the extraordinarily
close cooperation between the executive branch (the Ministry of Justice and
Foreign Affairs) and the Danish courts. Historically, there has always been a
close relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the national courts. Until
1999, Danish judges were exclusively recruited from the Ministry of Justice,
and loyalty to this executive body remains almost unchallenged (Christensen,
2003: 75–90; interviews with Danish judges and civil servants, March 2006).
This explains, at least in part, the influential role of the Judicial Committee as
regards preliminary referrals. The Judicial Committee was established in 1973
and is a government committee consisting of high-ranking civil servants from
the relevant ministries. The chair is held by the Ministry of Justice. In his study,
Pagh demonstrates not only how the Ministry of Justice, together with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Judicial Committee, participates in the
selection and drafting of questions on Article 234 to the ECJ when a national
court considers whether to refer or not, but also that the Committee advises
the government in the implementation of EU law (Pagh, 2004). Moreover, the
Judicial Committee is an important player when it comes to infringement cases
against the Danish state and acts as a drafter of those written interventions
that all governments can submit for cases pending before the ECJ. The Judicial
Committee thus plays several roles and has highly conflicting interests.
Because there is no tradition of the judicial review of legislation in
Denmark, the preliminary referral procedure has been regarded with
considerable suspicion, both at the national administrative level and within
the courts themselves (Pagh, 2004; own research). Danish courts have thus
repeatedly invoked the acte claire doctrine and generally – in nice accordance
with its strict dualist tradition – made efforts to interpret the compatibility
between Danish and EU law themselves (Pagh, 2004).
The Danish constitution formally refers to a division of powers between the
different branches of government, noting that ‘Judicial authority shall be
vested in the courts of justice’. Nevertheless, the Judicial Committee has been
involved in the drafting of preliminary referrals by the courts since 1978
(Pagh, 2004: 305). Our research shows that, because of its many overlapping
and occasionally contradictory tasks, the Judicial Committee will have very
few incentives to recommend to the national court to make a preliminary
referral. A comprehensive survey conducted amongst all Danish judges in
the winter of 2006 on this issue confirmed that one of the main reasons for
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the low number of preliminary referrals was discouragement from the legal
adviser to the Danish government based on a so-called ‘responsa’ by the
Committee.5 Asked specifically about the main reason for not making any (or
very few) preliminary referrals, an overwhelming 69.8% referred to dis-
couragement from the state adviser. Since it is not required in Denmark to
report when a preliminary referral has been requested from one or both of
the parties to a case (but rejected by the courts), we have only a vague sense
of the relationship between the number of cases actually referred and the
number of requests for preliminary referrals made in court by parties to 
a case.6 According to Pagh, however, the involvement of the Judicial
Committee is the most convincing single explanatory factor in the low
number of referrals from Danish courts since Denmark became a member of
the European Community. Pagh’s study shows that between 1986 and 2003
the Judicial Committee recommended not referring a case to the ECJ in 20 out
of 26 cases, even though all 26 cases dealt with the interpretation of EU law
and at least one of the parties had requested an interpretation by the 
ECJ (Pagh, 2004: 307). Generally speaking, the Judicial Committee has 
recommended Danish courts to make preliminary referrals only in those 
cases where direct action is already being taken against Denmark by the
Commission.7
Interestingly, civil servants dealing with preliminary referral issues in the
Foreign Ministry go so far as to note openly that ‘there are courts that we
cannot control’ (interview, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September
2005), implying that there was indeed an instance or two in which a lower
Danish court referred a case to the ECJ against the will of the Judicial
Committee. Referring cases without the Committee’s consent is unusual. In
our survey, 41.1% of the judges in the lower courts stated that it is up to the
High Court alone to decide whether or not a case ought to be referred to the
ECJ. The legal hierarchy that the preliminary ruling procedure in many ways
was established to challenge has thus gone untouched in the Danish case.
It is important to note, however, that a common understanding exists
amongst civil servants and judges that it is important for the two branches
to work closely together to avoid ex post demands for supranational legal
clarifications. It can also be argued that the involvement of the Judicial
Committee in the early years of Danish EC membership may be excused with
reference to unfamiliarity with judicial review and EC law in general. In the
early years, when the national courts were in a learning process, the need for
specialized advice may have been legitimate. However, such initial problems
can hardly explain why the Judicial Committee continues to influence the
degree to which cases are referred to the ECJ.
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The UK case
In the UK, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has long ruled the
relationship between the judiciary and parliament. This doctrine establishes
that British courts do not possess the power to declare a parliamentary act
unconstitutional (Dworkin, 1996: 352ff). Ultimate power is placed in the
hands of the people, as represented by Parliament. The traditional hegemonic
position of Parliament is deeply embedded in the relationship between the
law and politics; politics comes first and courts are considered to be an anti-
majoritarian force even by lawyers. Even British ‘lawyers say that Parliament
is an absolute sovereign because that seems (for most of them intuitively and
unreflectively) the best interpretation of British legal history, practice, and
tradition’ (Dworkin, 1996: 360). In addition to structuring domestic politics,
we argue that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a major expla-
nation of why British courts have been reluctant to refer preliminary cases to
the ECJ. When the historically institutionalized understanding of democracy
determines that the final word always rests with Parliament and not with the
courts, this institutional legacy is likely to prevail for decades and restrain
judicial behaviour, although in principle reversed by the norms and rules of
Community law.
As traditionally governed by the sovereign Parliament, the British courts
had no power of legislative review (Chalmers, 2001: 173; Craig, 1998;
Dworkin, 1996). In principle, the British courts were therefore strongly
empowered by the UK’s entry into the European Community in 1973. The
1972 European Communities Act stated that, in the event of conflict between
British law and EC law, the latter should prevail. The act also stated that
possible disputes regarding the interpretation or effect of Community law
ought to be treated as a matter of law by British courts, and the highest British
court of appeal – the House of Lords – was obliged to refer disputes to the
ECJ; lower courts could also do so (Norton, 1994: 326).
In principle, the EC law thereby challenged the division of labour
between politics and law in the UK, and thus the supreme position of Parlia-
ment. However, the British courts did not explicitly accept EU law supremacy
before the Factortame case in 1990. As concerns preliminary rulings, these
were simply not made during the first decades of membership (Craig, 1998:
200–5). In his study, Golub found that instead of referring EC-relevant
environmental cases to the ECJ, the British courts consistently invoked the
acte claire doctrine and interpreted the directives themselves (Golub, 1996b:
369; Craig, 1998: 205–6). As in the Danish case, acte claire was used intensively
by British courts and strongly encouraged by authoritative figures such as
Lord Denning.8 In Bulmer, Denning instructed British judges to clarify matters
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themselves rather than sending preliminary referrals to the ECJ (Bulmer v.
Bollinger, 1974, 3 Weekly Law Reports 202; Craig, 1998: 205; Golub, 1996b: 372).
This general invocation of acte claire restricted the behaviour of the British
courts vis-à-vis the ECJ for approximately a decade and in part explains the
low British referral rate until the mid-1980s. Later guidelines came to narrow
the discretion of the British judiciary (Golub, 1996b: 372). In the ApS Samex
decision (1983), it was suddenly found that the use of acte claire should be
limited, since ‘the ECJ was in a far better position than a national court to
determine issues of Community law’ (Customs and Excise Commissioners v. ApS
Samex, 1 All England Law Reports 1042 (1983); Bingham cited in Craig 1998:
206). The decision has subsequently been interpreted as yet another authori-
tative guideline for British judges when considering whether or not to refer
to the ECJ. The recognition of the need to refer certain matters supranation-
ally may explain the limited increase in referrals from the UK in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the Factortame judgment in 1990 made irrevocably clear that
British courts could suspend an Act of Parliament that breached EC law
(Chalmers, 2001; Craig, 1998: 207–9; R v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte
Factortame, (No 1) [1990] 2 AC 85).
Although British referral practice has undergone change, we argue that
majoritarian democracy continues to serve as a structuring factor. First, the
authoritative guidelines to invoke acte claire offered an efficient means to
shield the national system and thus ultimately majoritarian sovereignty. It
thus represented an instrument for maintaining the historically institutional-
ized division of labour between the courts and politics. Second, the ident-
ified judicial learning appears rather ‘sectorized’. According to the statistical
work carried out by Chalmers, EC law was invoked in the British courts
within a very narrow focus, mainly concerning taxation, sex discrimination,
free movement of goods, free movement of persons and intellectual property.
Furthermore, the invoking was centred around single items of EC legislation
or Treaty provisions (Chalmers, 2001: 179). The narrow and sectorized
learning pattern is confirmed by our data analysis, in which the preliminary
referrals of each member state have been classified according to regulatory
field. Of 104 possible regulatory fields, 44% of the British referrals fell
narrowly within just six bands; agriculture (10%), social provisions, includ-
ing sex discrimination (10%), taxation (7%), free movement of goods (6%),
Value Added Tax (6%) and social security for migrant workers (5%).
In sum, majoritarian democracy in Denmark and the UK produces similar
‘filters’ when national courts approach the ECJ, which shield the national
system to different degrees. First, the institutionalized division of labour
between law and politics rests on the supreme position of politics. Executive
institutions, such as the Danish Judicial Committee, may indeed control when
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and how national courts address the supranational legal system. Second, the
doctrine of acte claire offers an effective means of hindering the formulation of
questions to the ECJ. Third, learning may take place, but still tends to unfold
as rather sectorized learning. Such key institutions are the main factors
explaining why national courts embedded and socialized within the insti-
tutional legacy of majoritarian democracy tend to remain reluctant Europeans.
Testing determinants on variation – panel data analysis
In order to determine the relative impact of majoritarian democracy on the
number of referrals, we estimate a panel data model for the number of
referrals (per million inhabitants in logs) of member state i at year t.9 We chose
the following member state characteristics: intra-EC trade per million in-
habitants in logs, years of EC membership, a majoritarian democracy dummy
indicator, national population (in logs), dummy variables for the year of entry
into the EC, and level shift variables for the series of EC enlargements.
Longitudinal data take advantage of both time and national variation,
thus allowing the inclusion as potential determinants of the number of
referrals of variables that change only across countries, such as majoritarian
democracy, variables that change only across years, such as EC enlargements,
and variables that change over time and country, such as intra-EC trade. An
important feature of the panel data models is that it becomes possible to
account for unobservable country heterogeneity, for example qualitative
differences in judicial systems or in the implementation process.
We estimate the panel data model as a random-effects model with gener-
alized least squares (GLS).10 The estimation results are presented in Table 2.
As Table 2 shows, the estimates produce several interesting results.
First, ceteris paribus, population size is not significant.
Second, years of membership has practically no effect on majoritarian
democracies, and a negative effect on countries without majoritarian democ-
racy. For these countries, an extra year of membership reduces referrals per
million inhabitants by 5.6%. This result implies that the difference in terms of
referrals between the two types of democratic organization slowly declines
with years of membership, such that, after three years as EC members,
countries with majoritarian democracy refer 55.0% less than non-majoritarian
democracies, and after 12 years in the EC the gap is halved and majoritarian
democracies refer 26.8% less than countries without this type of democracy.
The hypothesis that the institutional legacy of majoritarian democracy tends
to make national courts considerably more reluctant to bring cases to a supra-
national system of judicial review is thus supported.
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Third, our analysis confirms that intra-EC trade has no significant effect
on the number of preliminary referrals. Note that Granger causality can also
be tested in a panel model, where it is possible to allow that causality between
number of referrals and intra-EC trade might vary across different countries
(see, for example, Holtz-Eakin et al., 1985). However, as is well known in time
series analysis, the presence of causality in some direction between referrals
and trade in some countries implies the presence of causality at the level of
aggregated referrals and aggregated trade (see Lütkepohl, 1991).
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Table 2 GLS estimation of random-effects panel data model
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2
Founding member 1.064* 1.036*
(0.577) (0.552)
Country enters the EC in 1973 –0.281 –0.319
(0.405) (0.396)
Country enters the EC between 1981 and 1986 –0.917** –0.966**
(0.417) (0.408)
EC enlargement 1973 0.891*** 0.933***
(0.211) (0.261)
EC enlargement 1981 0.528*** 0.531***
(0.182) (0.188)
EC enlargement 1986 0.126 0.114
(0.171) (0.172)
EC enlargement 1995 0.299* 0.292
(0.180) (0.180)
Majoritarian democracy –0.960*** –0.991***
(0.305) (0.355)
Majoritarian democracy * years since membership 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.020)
Intra–EC trade per mill. inhab. –0.099 –0.282
(0.376) (0.561)
Intra–EC trade per mill. inhab.* years since membership 0.003
(0.005)
Years since membership –0.058* –0.053*
(0.033) (0.032)
Years since membership2 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Population –0.664 –0.818
(0.455) (0.576)
R2 within 0.400 0.401
R2 between 0.836 0.836
p-value of Wald test for joint significance 0.000*** 0.000***
Hausman Test 0.90 0.91
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Two specifications made in Models 1 and 2 for the intra-EC trade effect
are attempted. In contrast to Model 1, Model 2 allows interaction between
intra-EC trade and years since membership in order to capture the possible
changing effect of intra-EC trade for those countries with more experience as
EC members (in the spirit of Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998). As seen in 
Table 2, none of the regressors, including intra-EC trade, is significant.
Fourth, EC enlargements, occurring in 1973, 1981 and 1995, have a
positive impact on referral generation.
Finally, the dummy for countries entering the EC between 1981 and 1986,
e.g. Spain, Portugal or Greece, has a negative effect, which may partly reflect
the less developed judicial systems of these countries. Explanatory factors for
the more reluctant referral patterns in the southern member states call for
more in-depth analysis combining quantitative findings with qualitative
method explanations.
Concluding remarks
European integration continues to have a strong judicial component, in which
the European Court of Justice plays a crucial role in clarifying, substantiating
and setting the direction Europe is to take. In this process of clarifying and
substantiating the content of Europe, national courts constitute pivotal
players. However, national courts are not participating evenly in this legal
push for Europe.
In this paper, we have tested the causality assumption of the modified
neo-functional approach, which argues that the driving dynamic behind 
court referrals to the ECJ is the level of intra-EC trade. Our findings reject
causality between intra-EC trade and preliminary referrals in any direction.
The level of economic integration does not explain or predict legal inte-
gration; or vice versa for that matter.
Our panel data analysis supports the hypothesis that member states with
majoritarian democracy are less inclined than others to participate in the legal
construction of the EU. The strong negative effect of majoritarian democracy
on the preliminary referral rates of individual member states suggests that
the institutional legacy of the type of democracy that continues to emphasize
the supremacy of parliament and thereby to restrain judicial behaviour may
prevail for decades. Our findings thus propose that majoritarian government
and the internal balance of power between different governmental branches
in the member states may affect the extent to which national courts willingly
participate in the (judicial) construction of Europe.
The panel data analysis cannot do it alone, of course; and the analytical
results derived invite further comparative research. Such future research
Wind et al. The Uneven Legal Push for Europe 8 1
 at Copenhagen University Library on February 26, 2009 http://eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
should aim to further unpack the institutions of majoritarian democracy and
how these may function as built-in shields that structure and delimit the
approach to Europe. Such shields and practices ought to be examined over
time, because they are clearly not static or unbending, but may prove to be
strong. Our findings suggest that the normative power of majoritarian
democracy in European societies may go beyond scepticism towards legal
integration and extend to a general scepticism towards the European polity,
because the supranational construct essentially compromises the founding
idea of parliamentary sovereignty.
The implications of the uneven legal push for Europe are significant.
When some member states remain at arms’ length from the legal integration
process, they do not bring the questions determining significant parts of the
direction and scope of the European polity in a piecemeal manner. Nor are
their systems, policies and citizens confronted or integrated to quite the same
extent as those in other parts of the enlarged and expanding EU.
Appendix: Granger causality analysis robust to
cointegration and level shifts
The Granger causality analysis is typically carried out by means of a vector
autoregressive model (VAR(k)), which is a model explaining the joint
dynamics of a set of variables, in this case intra-EC trade (TRADE) and
number of referrals (REF), by means of a VAR(k) model:
REFt = μ1 + ν11t + ν12t2 + a1 REFt – 1 + . . . + ak REFt – k· + b1
TRADEt – 1 + . . . + bk TRADEt – 1 + e1t
TRADEt = μ2 + ν21t + ν22t2 + c1 REFt – 1 + . . . + ck REFt – k· + d1
TRADEt – 1 + . . . + dk TRADEt – 1 + e2t
where REFt is the total number of referrals at year t, TRADEt is the intra-EC
trade at year t, REFt – l is the total number of referrals at year t – l, 
TRADEt – l is the intra-EC trade at year t – l, μ1 is an intercept, t is a linear trend,
t2 is a quadratic trend, and e1t and e2t are error terms serially uncorrelated.
REF Granger is said to cause TRADE when the past of REF helps predict
the future of TRADE, which in terms of this model implies that at least one
of the c1, . . . ck coefficients is different from 0. The hypothesis tested is the
absence of Granger causality. Then REF does not cause TRADE when c1 =
. . . = ck = 0, and TRADE does not cause REF when b1 = . . . = bk = 0. The
Granger causality approach in Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) does not require
knowing about the cointegration properties of the data. The only aspects of
the model that must be determined are the lag length k, which in the case of
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annual data is rarely greater than 4, and whether the deterministic component
should include a constant only, a constant and a linear trend, or a constant,
a linear trend and a quadratic trend.
Once all of these features are determined, a Wald test statistic for joint
significance of the first k lags in a VAR(k + 1) is a test of Granger causality.
For example, in the case of k = 3, a VAR(4) model is used, and the absence
of causality from TRADE to REF is tested by testing that condition b1 = b2 =
b3 = 0 holds, and the absence of causality from REF to TRADE is tested
through the condition c1 = c2 = c3 = 0.
If there are level shifts, i.e. the intercept changes over the sample period,
the preceding test tends to find causality even when there is not. Following
the recommendation of Ng and Vogelsang, detecting the location of mean
shifts is necessary, removing the deterministic component, including the level
shifts, from the data, and subsequently performing the usual causality test
with the de-trended data. To do this, we allow for a maximum of three mean
shifts and restrict the dates to the immediate years of the EC-9, EC-12 and
EC-15 enlargements, and use the Bai and Perron (1998) method to detect the
dates of the shifts. We find one mean shift in the variable REF for the year
1986 and two mean shifts in TRADE coinciding with the EC-9 and EC-15
enlargement years 1973 and 1995. The only difference with respect to the
Pitarakis and Tridimas analysis is the inclusion of a quadratic trend in the
VAR model. The results also apply in the case of a linear trend.
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Appendix Table 1 Deterministic component of REFt and TRADEt variables
REFt TRADEt
Constant 1.1365 –0.0748
(0.1314) (0.0395)
Trend 0.2343 0.1642
(0.0127) (0.0063)
Trend2 –0.0029 –0.0014
(0.0003) (0.0001)
Dummy 1973 0.5093
(0.0523)
Dummy 1986 –0.4411
(0.1466)
Dummy 1995 0.1154
(0.0541)
Impulse 1961 –1.3679
(0.2640)
Impulse 1966 –2.4383
(0.2466)
 at Copenhagen University Library on February 26, 2009 http://eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The dataset, do-file, and additional tables for the empirical analysis in this article
can be found at http://eup.sagepub.com/supplemental/
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the editor and the reviewers of European Union Politics for their very constructive
criticisms.
1 The research for this paper has combined quantitative analysis with quali-
tative case-study methods. For the quantitative part, we constructed a
database in which all preliminary referrals to the European Court of Justice
in the period 1961–2004 were coded. The preliminary referrals were cross-
examined and coded in relation to the referring member state, membership
period, population size and level of intra-EC trade in relation to GDP. The
judgements have also been coded according to the regulatory field and the
court level of the referring national court. The qualitative research consists of
a series of interviews with key respondents among lawyers and civil servants.
In addition, a survey of 380 Danish judges was conducted.
2 Case C-265/00 is recorded by the ECJ as submitted by Benelux and has there-
fore been excluded from this figure. Hungary was also excluded; it was the
only country among the 10 new member states to submit referrals in 2004
(two in total – ECJ, 2005). The official EU acronyms are used: be = Belgium,
de = Germany, fr = France, it = Italy, lu = Luxembourg, nl = Nether-
lands, uk = United Kingdom, irl = Ireland, dk = Denmark, pt = Portugal,
es = Spain, el = Greece, fi = Finland, se = Sweden, at = Austria.
3 As Martin Shapiro comments: ‘All things considered, I would opt for claiming
that the French indeed have achieved a flourishing judicial constitutional
review, peculiarly limited by its abstract only character but still roughly
comparable to constitutional judicial review elsewhere’ (Shapiro, 1999: 199).
This is supported by the analysis presented by Sarah Wright Sheive, who
directly compares the German Constitutional Court and the French Consti-
tutional Council in an article written in 1995. The Council approves all signifi-
cant legislation, and the Council’s abstract review power is a very effective
remedy for the parliamentary minority, which has often exploited this possi-
bility to force the government to amend new legislation. The same pattern is
found in Germany, where the ‘parliamentary majority is even more risk
averse in constitutional matters’, attempting to avoid new legislation being
forwarded to the Court (Sheive, 1995: 9). Moreover, the power of the consti-
tutional bodies in both France and Germany is underlined by the fact that
‘no legislative text has been invalidated after having been amended in
response to a constitutional court decision’ (Sheive, 1995: 9). As Sheive points
out, the French Constitutional Council is in fact often regarded as the most
anti-majoritarian of all European constitutional courts, because it practises
only a priori abstract review. This allows the constitutional court to forcefully
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influence policy initiatives by parliaments and thus act as a second legisla-
tive branch (Sheive, 1995: 10).
4 Monism as an explanatory factor is most apparent in the Netherlands and
Luxembourg, where international law (and thus also EU law) is regarded as
the higher law of the land (see Claes and de Witte, 1998). However, as Bribosia
(1998) has shown in his study of Belgium and the EU legal order, Belgium
also quickly accepted the EU legal order as superior (in 1971).
5 The 17-page questionnaire was sent to all (380) of the judges in Denmark;
62% of them responded.
6 It has become obligatory in Sweden for the national courts to explain why a
case has not been referred to the European Court of Justice when one of the
parties to a case has requested doing so. Law No. 502/2006 was adopted on
24 May 2006. The reason was a letter of formal notice sent by the European
Commission in October 2004 to the Swedish government. It argued that far
too few preliminary requests were made by Swedish courts – and in particu-
lar the Highest Court (Högsta Domstolen) – to the ECJ. Until this new statute
was adopted, Swedish courts – as is the case in Denmark today – could refuse
to make preliminary requests to the ECJ without accounting for the reasons
for not doing so.
7 In particular, the infamous ‘can case’, Case C-246/99, in which Denmark was
charged by the Commission for hindering the implementation of Directive
94/62 dealing with the marketing of cans instead of ordinary bottles in the
Danish market.
8 According to Lord Denning, a national court possessed discretion as whether
to refer a case or not and the following elements should be borne in mind
before such a radical step was taken: (a) the length of time it takes to process
a case in the ECJ; (b) the ECJ should not be overloaded with cases; (c) cases
should not be referred unless the point of Community law was important
and difficult; (d) the national court should bear in mind the costs for the
parties; and (e) the wishes of the parties to a case should be considered. If
one or two parties were not interested in hearing the opinion of the ECJ, this
was not recommendable (see Craig 1998: 205).
9 The panel data set is unbalanced owing to the inclusion of countries entering
the EC at different times.
10 It is important to check for the possible presence of correlation between 
the unobserved national effects and the explanatory variables included in the
panel model, since the presence of correlated heterogeneity invalidates the
estimates under the random-effects model. The Hausman specification test,
with a p-value of .90, clearly rejects any systematic difference between the
coefficients estimated under random effects and the coefficients estimated
with fixed effects.
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